In order to understand the many major theological problems which arose between East and West, both before and after the schism, the extraordinary impact upon Western thought of Augustine\u2019s polemics against Pelagius and Julian of Eclanum must be fully taken into account. In the Byzantine world, where Augustinian thought truthly exercised practically no influence, the significance of the sin of Adam and of its consequences for mankind was understood along quite different lines.<\/p>\n
In the Eastern Church man\u2019s relationship with God is truly understood as a communion of the human person with that which is above nature<\/em>. \u201cNature,\u201d therefore, designates that which is, in virtue of creation, distinct from God. But nature can and must be transcended; this is the privilege and the function of the free mind<\/em>, made \u201caccording to God\u2019s image.\u201d<\/p>\n In Greek patristic thought, only this free, personal mind can commit sin and incur the concomitant \u201cguilt\u201d – a point made particularly clear by Maximus in his distinction between \u201cnatural will\u201d and \u201cgnomic will.\u201d<\/p>\n The term ‘gnomic’ derives from the Greek\u00a0gnome<\/em>, meaning ‘inclination’ or ‘intention’. Within Eastern theology, gnomic willing is contrasted with natural willing. Natural willing designates the free movement of a creature in accordance with the principle of its nature towards the fulfillment of its being. Gnomic willing, on the other hand, designates that form of willing in which a person engages in a process of deliberation culminating in a free choice.<\/p>\n The theology of Maximus was endorsed by the\u00a06th Council when it condemned monothelitism. It stated that Jesus did not possess gnomic will.<\/p>\n Human nature, as God\u2019s creature, always exercises its dynamic properties (which together constitute the \u201cnatural will\u201d – a created dynamism) in accordance with the divine will which created it. But when the human person misuses its freedom by rebelling against both God and nature, it can distort the \u201cnatural will\u201d and thus corrupt nature itself. It is able to do so because it possesses freedom, or \u201cgnomic will,\u201d which is capable of orienting man toward the good and of \u201cimitating God\u201d. It is also capable of sin, because \u201cour salvation depends on our will\u201d. But sin is always a personal act, never an act of nature.<\/p>\n From these basic ideas about the personal character of sin, it is evident that the rebellion of Adam and Eve against God could be conceived only as their personal sin; there would be no place, then, in such an anthropology for the concept of inherited guilt, or for a \u201csin of nature,\u201d although it admits that human nature incurs the consequences of Adam\u2019s sin. In order to understand the many major theological problems which arose between East and West, both before and after the schism, the extraordinary impact upon Western thought of Augustine\u2019s polemics against Pelagius and Julian of Eclanum must be fully taken … Continue reading
\nThis truly takes some reflection!<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"